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ECONOMIC

Iff>ERIALIS~1

AND OLIOOPOLIZATICl~ OF TRADE
IN THE OOIJ) COAST: 1886-1939 *
by
Rhoda Howard

The takeover of the economy of the Gold Coast by foreign
business concerns, in conjunction with a foreign government
imposed by force upon the inhabitants of that territory,
provided the framework both for the integration of the Gold
Coast into the world capitalist system, and for the limitations to its potential for change and growth within that
system.
In general, the capitalist system encourages weaker,
undeveloped countries to develop by introducing them to new
markets and new products, but it also ensures .that the
interests of the weaker economies will be subordinate to the
interests of the stronger. Competitive advantages which
accrue to the older and richer capitalist states (eg. in
technology, accountancy, managerial skills and labour productivity) are reinforced by a constant tendency towards monopoly
of trade, and given permanence by the imposition of political
as well as economic control over peripheral countries. The
Ghanaian example demonstrates that even without the wholesale
expropriation of their lands and resources from a colonized
people, and even wi.thout the radical reorganization of indigenous society in the interests of the imperialist power, the
introduction of the capitalist system into an undeveloped
economy will distort future development in the direction of
the interests of the more developed capitalist economies.
Underdevelopment is concomitant with development.l
This article will deal with the mechanisms of the economic takeover of the Gold Coast, between approximately 1885
and 1939. Two aspects of the takeover are dealt with: the
progressive oligopolization of trading, shipping, and banking
in the colony, and the influence which oligopolistic British
firms exerted on government policy. The oligopolization resulted in the underdevelopment of the African trading class
and its inability to develop into a genuine capitalist class;

while the pursuance of a goverrunent policy dedicated to maintaining Ghana's role as a peripheral import-export economy
resulted in the internal economic underdevelopment of the
colony.
A.

European Oligopolization of the Gold Coast Trade.

From the time of their first contacts with each other
until the 1880's, African and European capitalists competed
on relatively equal terms in the Gold Coast. But with the
beginnings of oligopolization of trade, and the introduction
of foreign political control, opportunities for Gold Coast
Africans soon declined.
After the abolition of the slave trade, it was some
years before a new product was found which could guarantee
the Gold Coast's continued participation as a producer in the
world economy. But, with developments in industrial Europe,
by the end of the nineteenth century palm oil became a necessary ingredient for candles, soap, and machine oil, and cocoa
found a market as a new food to feed the now comparatively
weal thy working classes. A new "legitimate" role arose for
the Gold Coast, as a producer no longer of slave labour but
of industrial and consumer raw products. But the vast demand
for these goods necessitated more rapid and organized transport, the capacity to handle large amounts 9f goods on a
regular basis, and reliable supplies of capital and credit,
as well as regular commercial contacts not only in the Gold
Coast but also in Britain, on the Continent, and in America.
The needs of the industrialized West could no longer be fulfilled by small traders, African or European, with their
sporadic supplies. The process of sales and mergers which
culminated in the formation of the United Africa Company
(which by 1938 had engulfed no fewer than 145 firms) began
in 1900 with the first of the many trade agreements which
were to persist in the Gold Coast trade during the twentieth
century.
Chart 1 .indicates the major firms which were integrated
into the United Africa Company in 1929, as well as indicating
its competitors after that date. As can be seen, the system
was not a complete monolith. Several Continental firms .stood
outside of UAC control (although certain German firms which
had had a considerable share of the Gold Coast market were
eliminated from the scene during the first World War) • Moreover, certain British firms remained independent of its
control. Of these, the cocoa manufacturing companies, Cadbury
Brothers Ltd., J. S. Fry and Sons, and J. Lyons and Co. were
particularly significant in the Gold Coast context because,
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as they bought cocoa not for resale on the international
market but for their own chocolate manufacturing, they were
prepared to offer higher prices to African producers than the
trading firms could offer. It was not until the 1930's that
UAC was able to put sufficient pressure upon the chocolate
manufacturers through price undercutting and denial of shipping space, to compel them tO conform to the prices offered
by the giant merchant firms. 2
Nevertheless, from 1900 on, whatever competition existed
between the individual European firms on the Gold Coast was
tempered by sundry agreements to control both the buying and
the selling aspects of trade. Table 1 lists only some of
these agreements.
Table 1 - Trade Agreements in the Gold Coast
1. 01/10/1901. Pooling Agreement between the African Association Ltd., Alexander Millers and Co., and F.
and A. Swanzy Ltd.
2. 20/02/1902. Agreement ~ re palm kernels between the African
Association Ltd., Alexander Miller, Brother and
Co. , and the German West African Co.
Chart 1.
A.

European Firms in the Gold Coast

Major Firms forming the United Africa Company.3

African
Alex. Miller
Association
Brother and Co.
(1889) (1896) * (1865) (1868)

F. and A. Swanzy
(1807 or before)

African and Eastern
Trade Corporation **
(1919)

Niger Company
(1884)

takeover by
Lever Brothers
in 1920 ***

United Africa Company
(1929) ****
B.

Principal Competitors of the United Africa Company after
1929.

British
~adbury

European

Brothers Ltd. (1899) (1907)

Cie. Fran~aise de l'Afrique Occidentale (c.l845)
(amalgamated with Cadbury Bros .1918) (1909)
J. Lyons and Co. (1894) (?)
Socie'te Commerciale de

J .s. Fry and Sons Ltd. (1896)

(?)
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w.

l'Ouest Africain (1907)
Bartholemew and Co.(l926) (1926)
Busi and Stephenson Ltd.(?) (c.l930) (1914)
John Holt and Co. (Liverpool) Ltd. Swiss African Trading Co.
(1922) (1922)
(c. 1860) (c. 1935)
Union Trading Company(Basel
G.B. oilivant Ltd. (c.l840) (?)
Mission Trading Company)
Patterson, Zochonis and Co. Ltd.
(1865) (1865)
(1890) (c.l933)
C

Pr~ncipal

Shipping

Co~panies.

Elder, Dempster and Co. Ltd. (1899)
African Steam Ship Co. (1952)
comprising
and
British and African Steam Navigation Company (1865)
Woerrnann Lines (1882) (1885)
Elder Dempster and Woerrnann Lines joined into the West African
Shipping Conference 1895.
D.

Banks.

Bank of British West Africa Ltd. (1894) (1896). (formed by
Elder, Dempster and Co. Ltd.)
Colonial Bank (1836), entered Gold Coast 1916, name changed to
Barclays Bank ~minion, Colonial and Overseas 1925.

*

First brackets indicate date of incorporation, second
brackets indicate date of entry into the Gold Coast (when
information is available)
** Aside from those mentioned above, African · and Eastern included 26 other We at African companies.
*** and joined to 28 other West Africa companies previously
· or subsequently acquired by Lever Brothers.
**** Between 1929 and 1938 UAC acquired 29 more West Africa
Companies.
3. 03/ll/19.03. 1'ooling agreement between Messrs. F. and A.
Swanzy Ltd. and ~llers L_~d.
4. 01/03/1904. Agreement re sharing -in proportion to the capital
of each party the net profits of the businesses
of the parties carried -on in the Gold C0ast- and
the German Colony, between F. and A. Swanzy Ltd.,
Millers Ltd., and the African Association Ltd.
Expired 31/12/1913.
5. 10/05/1906;11/07/1910; 22/05/1913. Agreements between F.
and A. Swanzy, Millers Ltd., the African Association.
6. 1905. Accra Produce Agreement. Between F·. and A. Swanzy Ltd.,
Miliers Ltd., the African Association Ltd., J.
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J. Fischer and Co., the (Basel) Mission Trading
Company and the German West African Trading
Company.
7. 13/02/06. Volta Produce Agreement for pooling purchases of
cocoa, rubber, palm oil and palm kernels between
the (Basel) Mission Trading Company, F. and A.
Swanzy Ltd., Chevalier and Co., and Millers Ltd.
8. 1905, 1909, 1914. Sundry timber pool agreements between the
Gold Coast Machinery and Trading Co. Ltd., F.
and A. Swanzy Ltd., Millers Ltd., and the
African Association Ltd.
9. 27/07/12. Agreement re staple articles between the Basel
Mission Trading Co., the African Association
Ltd., Millers Ltd., and F. and A. Swanzy.
10. 1925/26. Cocoa Pool Agreement. African and Eastern Trade
Corporation and others.
11. 07/01/30. Agreement for the purchase and sale of palm oil
and palm kernels between the UAC, John Holt and
Co. (Liverpool) Ltd., G. B. Ollivant, and Pa·tterson and Zochonis.
12. 18/05/35. Agreement re the Gold Coast Motor Business between Cie. Francaise de !'Afrique Occidentale,
Societe Commerciale de !'Ouest Africain, Union
Trading Co., W. Bartholemew and Co., and UAC.
13. 30/11/36. Agreements covering the sale of palm oil and
palm kernels between UAC, John Holt and Co.,
and G. B. Ollivant Ltd.
14. 27/07/1934. Gold Coast Merchandise Agreement. (and supplement 18/06/1937).
15. 10/11/37. Agreement between w. Bartholemew and Co., UAC
and eleven others for division of cocoa in the
Gold Coast (The Cocoa Pool) .4
It can be seen from the above, that the Gold Coast trade
was very \'l"ell organized. Agreements, which never included any
African-owned firms, covered produce (including cocoa, palm
products, rubber, and timber) and merchandise. It should be
noted that not only exports but also imports were subject to
price fixing and that strong sanctions were imposed on those
partied to Agreements who did not adhere to the agreed structure. Moreover, prices charged for imported goods were geared to rise or fall with the prices paid for cocoa.
A comparison between cocoa and store
prices shows a connection. Merchants admit
that it is their practice to raise store
prices when cocoa prices rise. Merchants
meet once or twice per month in Sal tpond
and fix prices for their principal goods.
An 'Approved Price List' is produced •.•
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The total trade of each district is
divided amongst the firms and a firm is
allowed to sell a certain percentage only
of the total district sales of any of the
principal goods.5

The dominance of trade by European firms was reinforced
by tight European control of shipping and banking in the Colony. The two predominant shipping firms, Elder Dempster and
Woermann Lines, which were able to take control of the West
African trade when the introduction of steam ships eliminated
many of the smaller independent merchant-shippers who owned
sailing boats, joined into the West African Shipping COnference
in 1895. They effectively eliminated competition by insti tuting a system of 10% rebates to merchants who shipped exclu~
sively on their vessels. Elder Dempster further consolidated
its power by gaini~g control of lighterage and inland waterway
facilities in West Africa. Its weaker ally, Woermann Lines,
was also obliged to accept an agreement whereby Elder Dempster
could call at European ports but Woermann could not call at
British ports.6 Many European traders objected to this monopoly of shipping, especially as the larger merchants were able
to obtain special rates from Elder Dempster, despite that
company's protestations that it promoted competition by charging the same rates to all.
The oligopolistic control of the Gold Coast economy
was further reinforced in 1895 when the Elder Dempster shipping
line set up the first, and until 1916 the only, bank to exist
in the Gold Coast, the Bank of British West Africa. In 1916,
apparently without opposition, the Colonial Bank was permitted
to enter the Gold COast. A number of interlocking directorates
between these two banks, the shipping agencies, and the dominant trading firms (but excluding the chocolate manufacturing
companies) strengthened the tendency for co-operation.
Table 2 - Interlocking Directorships in the West African
Trade 8
Year

Name of Director

Companies Directed

'Sir Alfred Lewis Jones

Elder Dempster Shipping Ltd.
Bank of British West Africa
Elder Dempster Shipping Ltd.
Bank of British West Africa
Bank of British West Africa
Niger Company
Elder, Dempster and Co. Ltd.
Bank of British West Africa
African Association Ltd.

1905

Owen Harrison Williams

1915

Cli.fford Blackburn Edgar

1915

Sir Owen

1915

Mazzini Stuart

c. Philipps
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1915

Owen Harrison Williams

1925

James Henly Batty

Bank of British West Africa
African Steamship Company
British and African Steam
Navigation Co.
Bank of British West Africa
African and Eastern Trade Co.

0. V. G. Hoare

Ashanti Goldfields Corporation
African and Eastern Trade Co.

Ltd.

1925

Ltd.

1925
1925

Lord Kylsant
{Sir OWen c. Philipps)
Mazzini Stuart

Colonial Bank
Elder, Dempster and Co. L·t d.
Bank of British West Africa Ltd.
African and Eastern Trade Co.
Ltd.
Bank of British West Africa

From this selected list it will be noted that there were,
of course, strong ties between Elder Dempster and the Bank of
British West Africa. There were also ties between the Bank
and the trading firms which were later to become part of UAC,
as well as some ties between this group and Ashanti Goldfields,
the foremost gold mine in the Colony, and the Colonial Bank.
Added to these interlocking directorships were a host of external connections to banking, shipping, railway and insurance
companies in Britain, to independent soap-manufacturing companies, and to international mining consortia. It was ·a strong
network, based in the cities of Liverpool, London, and Manchester, and one which the African aspirant to trade could
hardly hope to crack.
Even when the African obtained space on the Conference
shipping lines, he could not hope to be charged the same preferential rates as the European bulk shippers. Nor could he
hope to be able to afford, with his limited resources, to bu~
the kind of large steam ship necessary for the modern trade.
Without adequate resources, it was also difficult for him to
obtain insurance. Moreover, the banks, when they entered the
West Coast, catered entirely to other Europeans. All the
European merchants, with the exception of the SWiss and French
firms, who sometimes preferred banks of their own nationality,
were financed through the Bank of British West Africa and the
Colonial Bank. During the cocoa season, millions of pounds
were made available by the banks to the European cocoa buyers.
The African buyer could not hope to command such amounts if
only because most decisions concerning large amounts of credit
were made by the Banks' Head Offices in London, where would-be
African borrowers did not have representatives. The bankers
argued that Africans did not "understand" the banking system.
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But willing as they were to accept such African deposits as
were offered, it seems the banks charged higher rates for
services to Africans than to Europeans.lO It could perhaps
therefore be argued that African traders understood the
banking system only too well.
The banks argued that Africans were a poor credit risk.
And it would indeed seem that if there were one single factor
which eliminated the Gold Coast African as a significant
competitor in the trading world, that factor would be credit.
The indigenous Gold Coast property and credit system had been
based on slave owning and pawning, ll institutions which were
_destroyed in righteous anger by the British in 1874. In the
absence of a system of private property in land, Africans
were left with nothing but gold trinkets and buildings to
offer· as collateral to Europeans from whom they wished to
obtain credit. The system was self-defeating, since as long
as they had to invest in houses in order to have mortgagable
property for credit purposes, Africans were compelled to
divert their resources from more profitable investments, thus
reinforcing the European view of them as spenders, not savers.
In any event, the trade after 1880 assumed large-scale
international proportions. Few Africans had, or could
marshal , the European and American contacts necessary to
enter the export-import trade in competition with the British.
A large proportion of Gold Coast produce went not to the
United Kingdom but to European and American markets. Similarly many imported goods came from outside the United Kingdom.
But agents hired in Britain to act for African traders were
at best unreliable and at worst dishonest. The prevalent
European view of the African as shiftless, unreliable, childlike and dishonest was no doubt a major cause both of the
reluctance of the honest banker or shipper to deal with the
indigenous tradesman, and of the alacrity with which the dishonest European cheated him.
While more than a few Africans became successful businessmen despite the difficul.t ies elaborated above, the most
common opportunity for the entrepreneurial Gold Coast African
after the 1880's was to act as a middle-man for the European.
There was little direct contact in the Gold Coast between
the expatriate businessman and the ultimate consumer or
producer of the goods in which he dealt. In a few of ·the
larger towns,retail shops tended to be managed by Europeans.
But for the most part, .they were managed by African agents
who not only sold imported goods but sometimes acted as cocoa
buyers as well. 12 These Africans were responsible for the
day-to-day running of the store, for all stocks, and o"ften for
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book-keeping. However, ultimate financial control and the
power to sign cheques remained in the hands of a European
supervisor. African agents were bound by contracts forbidding
them to engage in trade on their own or to move from one
··
employer to the next.l3
The African who did try to eng.age in trade on his own
could be, and was, easily undercut by his European competitors.
Should he nonetheless succeed, he was often offered a position
as an independent .agent for a European firm, with a guarantee
of more custom than he could obtain on his own. Through the
passbook system, which allowed each African retailer credit up
to a certain amount (often arbitrarily decided upon by whichever European he or she happened to be dealing with) the
African could easily be tied not only to the expatriate network but also to a specific expatriate firm. Because the
passbook system fulfilled the function of providing credit,
large African retailers were pulled into the hands of their
expatriate competitors.
A second middleman role for the African entrepreneur was
as a cocoa broker; one who, in return for advances from the
European cocoa firm, went in to the "bush" to buy cocoa from
the peasant producer. This role was more lucrative than that
of a store .agent. For aside from receiving his commission and
various perquisites (such as gifts, free bags, and rent-free
cocoa storage units) from the expatriate employer who had to
compete for his services with other European firms, the broker
could give advances on cocoa at a low price and then sell it
at a higher price at the time of the harvest. Moreover, as
the price of cocoa was known to fluctuate from day to day,
he could often argue that he had bought the cocoa at more than
the going price. And as there was a two to four day gap
before Accra prices reached the bush, he could compel his
European customer to pay him extra. Brokers often branched
out to become moneylenders and financially powerful members of
the community. But their wealth was insecure and they could
be wiped out by a fall in prices which did not repay their
advances .14
B.

European Firms and Economic Policy in the Gold Coast.

Between about 1880 and 1910 the Gold Coast entered the
world capitalist system as a full-fledged peripheral nation
producing raw materials for export to the rapacious factories
and workers of the industrial West. Her economy boomed as
both exports and imports increased phenomenally. But she paid
f or this boom with a stagnant economic structure. From 1910
unil the . second World War, the European firms, with the help
of the British government, sought to maintain the peripheral
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import-export monoculture which they found so profitable.
The aim of the political power in the Gold Coast was
to preserve the colony's economic value for Britain. Whatever the hurnani tarian and "civilizing" goals of the individual
members of the Colonial Service who administered that country,
the Colonial Office in London,which formulated most important
policies, was sensitive to an often in agreement with the
desires of the dominant British firms. Government and the
British business interests co-operated on several levels. 15
The most diffuse of these was that of personal contacts
between business and government in Britain and the colonies,
contacts often reinforced by the membership of prominent
West African traders in the House of Commons. In the colony
itsel£, close contact was inevitable as there were so few
expatriates.
On a formal level, co-operation was embodied in the
Joint West Africa Committee. This Committee was formed in
1905 with two members each from the Liverpool, Manchester,and
LORdon Chambers of Commerce, which regularly met with and
advised the Colonial Office. In 1903 these three Chambers had
also been granted the privilege of communicating directly with
the Governor of the Gold Coast. Consultation with both the
Colonial Office and the Governor was extensive.
Furthermore, whereas Africans rarely, almost never, were
asked to testify before the various Royal Commissions concerned with the West African colonies,l6 the expatriate commercial
community not only testified frequently to these committees
but often had representatives acting as Commissioners.l7
African and European unofficials were however given equal
representation on the Gold Coast Legislative Council. But on
almost all matters of disagreement in the Legislative Council
the European unofficials voted with their official counterparts
(a matter hardly surprising since the official policy was
formulated by. the Colonial Office in consultation with the
European unofficials' Head Offices in England). Thus the
African had no effective voice on the only governing body to
which he had access.
There were strong commercial reasons for the takeover
of the Gold Coast Colony in 1874 and the final takeover of
Ashanti and the Northern Territories in 1901. As the nature
of trade with the Gold Coast changed at the end of the nineteenth century, unhampered capitalism devoid of political
control was not sufficient to guarantee the adequate functioning of the import-export economy. The most important function
of the new British colonial government, from the point of view
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of the European capitalists, was to establish and efficient
and extensive transport system to facilitate the movement of
goods.
A secondary object was the maintenance of law and
order, that is the "pacification" of recalcitrant tribes who
were not willing to accept the new political and economic
order, especially in the hinterland of Ashanti and the Northern
Territories. 1 8 Ashanti especially was viewed as a huge
potential market for cheap manufactured goods, which the
coastal-based Europeans were anxious to exploit.
In the early part of the twentieth century, and again in
the 1920's there were extensive railway building programs,
first leading to the mines and later extending to the cocoaproducing areas. Road building was also encouraged as soon
as the motor lorry was invented.. Three types of roads were
built. In descending order of priority, they were feeder
roads to the railways, trade roads, and "political" roads
built to facilitate adrninistration.l9
But once an adequate system of transport had been
constructed and the entire territory had been opened up to
European traders, pressure for expenditure on development
from the commercial community diminished, and a concern for
"free trade" became evident. The Gold Coast had been satisfactorily integrated into the world capitalist system as a
producer of raw materials and a consumer of cheap manufactured
goods, and any further expenditure by the Government, designed
to lessen the Colony's dependence on this relationship to the
Ernp~re and the world, was viewed with suspicion as an unnecessary attempt to impose taxes on the expatriate firms.
Thus until 1939 the pattern of Gold Coast imports and
exports was very clearly one of dependence on the 'mother
country" and on international market trends. Whereas until
1910 several different crops had been exported from the colony,
after that date the Gold Coast became heavily monocultural.
Table 3: Major Exports - Per Cent of the Total by Value20
Year

1886
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
1915
1920

Cocoa

0.05
3.05
11.36
32.11
61.53
81.41

Palm Palm Rubber
Oil Kernels

38.33
24.13
26.31
27.01
5.35
5.97
0.44
0.92

11.79
12.98
10.59
10.96
4.68
6.86
0.84
1.80

17.20
38.44
36.67
37.06
19.68
13.31
0.42
0.22

Timber

Gold

0.08
3.19
7.68
5.10
5.49
1.53
2. 77

18.43
15.31
10.36
4.29
36.21
29.29
29.53
7.20

Diamonds Manganese
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1925
1930
1935
1939

75.50
61.75
52.19
31.42

0.40 . 1.06 0.31
0.10 0.61 0.19
0.07 0.43 0.14
. 0.03 0.17 0.20

. 7. 71
0.89 9.36
1.10 26.43
0.34 38.05

0.91
5.84
5.48
2.86

6.25
7.29
6.14
4.87

Exports of palm oil, palm kernels, rubber and timber declined
drastically on a proportional basis and the colony was left
almost entirely dependent for its revenues on cocoa and gold
exports. The price of cocoa fluctuated violently on the
world market, introducing chronic instability into the life
of the African cocoa producer. Especially after the creation
of the New York and London cocoa exchanges in the 1920's,
cocoa became subject ,to speculative buying and selling.
What few feeble attempts were made by the colonial
government to diversify the Gold Coast's exports and reduce
its dependence on cocoa were always constrained by the structure that they must not endanger the budget. But precisely
because the revenue of the colony was based upon import and
export customs dues, 21 infrastructural and other developments
were found to be limited by the vagaries of the international
market. Thus little long-range planning to protect the
economy could be implemented.
In any case, all suggestions for revitalizing the economy hinged around its open, extractive nature. As one
colonial official stated:
A country's wealth can be increased
either by manufacture, that is to say,
by converting raw products into finished
articles, or, alternatively, by production
and exportation. Of these two, the latter
is, obviously, the Gold Coast's metier.22
Discussions of diversification tended to revolve around
suggestions to promote new agricultural exports, and indeed
projects such as a sisal plantation in the early 1920's and·
a COBra plantation in the latter part of t?at decade, were
undertaken, without success, to reduce the dependence on
cocoa.23 Industry was not considered at all in the many
discussions of how to reduce the Gold Coast's monocultural
dependence.
The underdeveloped nature of an economy dependent on
agricultural and mineral exports was exacerbated by the
composition of imports, about two-thirds of which, even as
late as 1935, were destined for the consumer market, and
less than one-third of which could be considered investment
goods which would promote the expansion of the economy.

Table 4
Year

Imports - Per Cent of the Total b:t: Value

Tobacco
fOOd
drink

Clothing
leather
textiles

Other
consumer
goods

Total
consumer
imports

1900

36.86

21.21

21.95

1905

34.65

16.27

1910

28.70

1915

24

Construelion

fuel

machinery_

transport

80.02

5,67

1.91

4.88

4.66

17.12

16.01

66.93

13.17

4.29

7.54

3.96

28.96

14.83

19.74

63.27

11.08

3.33

6.31

11.75

32.47

38.38

11.44

16.99

66.81

10.65

2.87

5.91

10.31

29.74

1920

28.88

20.95

15.20

65.03

10.70

5.67

5.04

9.08

30.49

1925

27.06

28.20

12.39

67.65

8.46

5.72

4.52

6.90

25.60

1930

26.72

27.79

12.89

67.40

8.56

5.18

5.03

8.31

27.08

1935

29.69

20.09

14.72

64.50

9.00

4.34

6.23

10.63

30.20

1939

24.32

19.74

12.66

56.72

9.06

3.26

8.51

17.75

38.58

total

investment
goods

CD

w
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Before 1900, guns, amunition, and liquor, unproductive goods
which encouraged inter and intra-tribal warfare, were major
imports. The importation of guns and ammunition was reduced
after Ashanti and the Northern Territories had bE;!en "pacified",
much to the chagrin. of the British suppliers. But liquor
continued to constitute a large proportion of ;imports tin til
restrictions were imposed upon it in the early 1920's.25
The provisions imported from abroad encouraged Africans to
become dependent upon foreign foods and to neglect their own
supplies; in times of prosperity earnings were spent on foreign
foods instead of being invested in production. While construction goods could be considered investment goods, as
already mentione~, resources were diverted to family houses
when other investments might have been made. The importing of
motor vehicles did, however, encourage the development of an
indigenous transport business alongside the larger European
transport concerns. But the transport business suffered
during the 1920's and 30's from restrictions on the carriage
of cocoa and imported manufactured goods on major roads.,
restrictions which were designed to divert the revenues of the
import-export traffic away from African-owned transpOrt
businesses and toward the government-owned railways. 26
Nor was the dearth of productive imports mitigated by
direct European investment in the Gold Coast. It was only in
~n~ng that direct European control of the process of productiOn., with consequent investment, occurred. Although Africans
took 0 ut mining concessions for gold in the 1870's and 1880's,
they were obliged to sell these concessions to Europeans as
they could not afford the equipment necessary for modern
capitalist exploitation.2 7 Similarly when manganese and diamonds were discovered their production was immediately put
into the hands of Europeans. But aside from mining, it was
not necessary for Europeans to take over direct control to
obtain the products they desired. The enterprise of the inhabitants of the Gold Coast was sufficient to produce as much
as the expatriates could buy of agricultural and arboricultur,al goods. The companies were con tent to leave the land
and its exploitation in African hands. 28
··~

Moreover, very little investment was required to maintain the European retailing establishments which were necessary to induce the Africans to buy cheap manufactured goods.
The only investments made by the trading firms (aside from
investments by some of the firms in their own transport businesses), were in buying and selling stations, ·~ucky little
stores" , 29 a few sheds for storage of cocoa along the docks,
and bungalows for their European staff.
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Table 5. Values of Properties of Various Firms in
the Gold Coast, 30 September, 1923. 30
Company

Value of Property

African and Eastern Trade
corporation
Ashanti-obuasi Trading Co.
F. and A. Swanzy Ltd.
Gold Coast Machinery and
Trading Co. Ltd.
Millers Limited
Tarquah Trading Co.

I:. 161,483
I:. 23,256
:r. 357,905 (all African properties)

:r.
J:,
J:,

6,656
270,824 (all African properties)
59,039

Whatever investment was necessary for the improvement of
the Gold Coast's agricultural produce was expected to be made
by the farmers themselves, not by the firms which bought the
produce. Gold Coast cocoa, for example, was not subject to
compulsory quality control until 1934. Government pleas to
finns to institute cocoa standards and to pay fanners better
prices for better quality cocoa went unheeded. But without
higher prices for better cocoa, farmers had neither the income
nor the incentive to invest in such improvements as cocoa
storage sheds. The business coillllluni ty was in favour of some
sort of produce inspection scheme, but one which penalized the
growers for selling poor quality cocoa, not the firms for
buying it. · As an alternative to such penal legislation the
government introduced a co-operative scheme whereby fanners
would grCM better quality cocoa on their own initiative and in
return be granted certain privileges such as access to credit.
The firms agreed to pay higher prices for the better cocoa, but
they offered a maximum increase of only 6 d. a load (60 lbs.),
not enough to cover the farmers' extra expenses which averaged
about 11-3/4 d. extra a load.
As they argued that they should not be held responsible
for investment in production, so also the European firms
argued that they should not be responsible for government
revenue in the Gold Coast. They resisted all attempts at
taxation and reiterated constantly that in principle they
were opposed to all import and export dues, the main source of
revenue, since such dues, when applied to goods such as cocoa
or timber, would render production too costly and prohibit
competition with French or German traders. But in fact it was
recognized by government, businessmen, and farmers alike that
it was the African producer or consumer who actually bore the
brunt of the import and export dues, and hence the burden of
financing the government. Between 1886 and 1939 between 56%
and 86% of the government's revenues came from import and
export dues paid indirectly by African consumers and producers.
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Table 6.

Import and Export Dues as Per Cent of
Government Revenue. 32

Year _ Import Dues
%

1886
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1939

84.42
85.23
86.05
73.37
57.00
60.68
56.87
45.97
52.60
53.43
56.85
44.97

Export Dues

Total Import

&

Export Dues

%

%

15.34
6.66
11.08
16.49
24.40

84.42
85.23
86.05
73 . 37
57.00
60.68
56.87
61.31
59.26
64.51
73.34
69.37

Whenever import duties were raised, so also prices charged to
African customers were raised.Moreover, a price once raised
was not lowered if the duties were removed. Similarly, after
1916 when export duties were introduced, the price paid to the
cocoa -producer was reduced. 33
Africans were also responsible for financing construction and urbanization in the Gold Coast. Under the Public
Lands Act of 1876 the government took for itself the privilege
of expropriating,without payment,land necessary for railways
and public buildings. Until 1919 the Government also used
this Act to expropriate high-value land in areas such as
Accra, Cape Coast, Sekondi and Kumasi and rent it out to expatriate commercial firms, the rent monies going not to the
original owners but to the government. 34 Such a policy was a
deterrrent to the rise of an African bourgeoisie with an income based on urban property values.
Thus, once the economy of the Gold Coast had evolved
into the classic peripheral pattern providing _agricultural,
arboricultural and mineral products to the mother country in
retu= for generally unproductive consumer goods, the European firms exerted their influence to frustrate government
plans for diversification and development of the economy.
Such plans were, in their eyes, unnecessary and likely to
upset the balance of economic forces. What little development
occurred was financed ultimately by the Africans themselves.
Economic imperialism and the oligopolization of the Gold Coast
trade ensured that this development would be limited. Indeed,
underdevelopment became the norm as individual African traders
were consistently denied the opportunity to partake in the
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intern<!-tional trading system. Ultimately, both the economy
and the indigenous farmers and traders were subject to the
control of an external economy and a foreign capitalist class
which consistently acted to maintain the Gold Coast in a
peripheral role in the world capitalist system.

*

Based on a paper presented to the Canadian Association of
African Studies, February 1975. This article is abstracted
from the author's forthcoming doctoral dissertation, "Expatriate Business and the African Response in Ghana, 18851939", Department of Sociology, McGill University, Montreal.
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Footnotes
1

I use the term development to mean economic development,
that is the growth of capitalism, with all its attendant
ills, leaving moot the question whether development on
socialist lines is possible in a society which has not
yet undergone a capitalist phase. I define underdevelopment as the process by which a country's realistic possibilities for economic growth are thwarted and dis tor ted 1
usually by contact with a more developed power. In
defining underdevelopment thus, I am adopting the practice
of A.G.Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin
America (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969) E. A. Brett,
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London,
Heinemann, 1973) and others.

2

From "Notes on the United Africa Company Limited", in
United Africa Company Archives, London, document 1/5580,
"The History of the Company to 1938",

3

Norman Edwards, Cadbury on the Gold Coast (Bournville,
Publications Department, 1955, private circulation only)
p. 29.

4

This table is taken from listings of the United Africa
Company's archival holdings in London. Unfortunately the
author did not obtain access to the actual agreements.
Presumably the list is not complete.

5

Memorandum written by the Acting District Commissioner of
Saltpond, 12 January 1938, file Adm , 23/1/956, Ghana
National Archives, Cape Coast.

6

P.N. Davies, The Trade Makers, Elder Dempster in West
Africa, 1852-1972. (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1973).
pp. 108-09.

7

Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, Cd. 4668, 1909, testimony of George Miller, Q. 4374. In the 1930's both UAC
and John Holt we re able to obtain substantial concessions
from Elder Dempster because of their large shares in the
West African trade; the former company set up its own
shipping line in defiance of Elder Dempster's ruling
that merchants must ship exclusively on Conference lines.
The History of the United Africa Company Limited to 1938
(London, United Africa Company, 1939, private circulation
only), pp . 117 and 143.

8

Directory of Directors, United Kingdom 1905, 1915, 1925.
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9

Although one William Ocansey, of Ada, did instruct his
Liverpool agent in 1880 to buy him a steam launch to be
used in transporting goods down the Volta River. The
agent absconded with the money, some b 2,679. John Ocansey, African Trading (Liverpool, James Looney, 1881). p.
16 ff.

10

United Africa Company Archives, document 588, Bank of
British West Africa. A sheet dated 1 February 1905 lists
charges for various services including bank drafts,
purchase and colrection of cheques, and charges for
distribution of gold and acceptance of notes. In all
cases "natives" and "African trading firms" are charged
more than Government employees and Europeans.

11

Pawning was a system whereby in return for a loan the
debtor would "pawn" one of his relatives to work for the
creditor until the debt was repaid.

12

The following section is based on interviews with African
formerly employed as agents for European firms.

13

Examples of such contracts can be found in the United
Africa Company Archives, files entitled "John Walkden
and Co.", and "Pickering and Berthoud Native Storekeepers
Agreement. "
For a detailed description of the role of the cocoa
broker, see Report of the Commission on the Marketing of
West African Cocoa (The Nowell Commission), Cmd. 5845,
1938.
This section is based on the following sources. The Incorporated Chamber of Commerce of Liverpool, Annual
Reports 1886-1901 and African Trade Section, Minutes, 19021925; The London Chamber of Commerce Incorporated, Annual
Reports 1882-1903, and West Africa Section, Minutes, 19031938; The Manchester Chamber of Commerce African Sectional
Committee, Minutes, 1892-1938; and the Joint West Africa
Committee, Minutes, 1905-1919.

16

7

Such as the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings (Cd. 4668,·
1909), the West African Currency Committee (Cd. 6426,1912),
and the Committee on Trade and Taxation in British West
Africa (Cmd. 1600, 1921).
Such as Leslie Couper, who was on the West African
Currency Board from 1921 to 1929, and his successor, R.
Roy Wilson, on the Board from 1929 to 1938, both of whom
were also Directors of the Bank of British West Africa.
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West African CUrrency Board, Reports, 1920 - 1938.
~8

The Broclamation announcing the takeover of the Gold Coast
Colony in 1874 listed, among other purposes: " ••• the
protection and encouragement of trade and traders, including the construction, maintenance and improvement of
roads, paths, bridges, harbour works, water ways, telegraphs, and other public works which benefit trade and
promote civilization", and "The maintenance of an armed
police force for the preservation of internal order and
the prevention of foreign aggression." Quoted in J. E.
Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions; (London,
Frank Cass and Co., 1970), p. 366.

19

Speech by Governor Guggisberg in Gold Coast, Legislative
Council Debates, 22 February 1926.

20

Figures for 1886, 1890 and 1895 are based on the Gold
Coast Blue Books. For 1900 and subsequent years, the
percentages are based on Table 18, "Imports, Exports, and
the Balance of Visible Trade", and Table 21a, "Value of
Major Exports, 1900-1960" in G. B. Kay, The Political
Economy of Colonialism in Ghana, (Cambridge, at the
University Press, 1972), pp. 325-326 and 334-335.

21

See table 6 below.

22

Quoted by Nana Ofori Atta, an unofficial African representative, in the Gold Coast Legislative Council, 19 March
1935. Unfortunately the o~iginal speaker, a former Colonial Secretary, is unnamed.

23

Also in the 1920's, one British firm offered to build up
the banana export industry on condition that it be granted
a monopoly of such exports. The offer was turned down.
The firm involved, Elders and Fyffes, was connected to the
Elder Dempster shipping line but, more immediately, was a
subsidiary of United Fruit. Manchester Chamber of
Commerce, Africa Section, Minutes, 12 February 1931.

24

Figures are based on Kay,op. cit., Table 20a, "Value
of Imports by Commodity Groups, 1900-1960", pp. 327-328.

25

For a description of the use of alcohol in Ghanaian society see Raymond E. Dumett, "The Social Impact .of the
European Liquor Trade on the Akan of Ghana (Gold Coast and
Asante) , 1875-1910", Journal of Interdisciplinary History,
vol. I, summer 1974. Dumett argues .that the liquor trade
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was not as deleterious as others have argued. The
commercial importance of the arms and ammunition trade is
attested to by the numerous references thereto in the
records of the Chambers of Commerce of Manchester, London,
and Liverpool, as well as by the frequency with which it
was discussed in the Joint West Africa Committee.
26

The problem of competition between roads and the railway
is discussed in file Adm. 23/1/762 Ghana National Archives
Cape Coast. See also Peter R. Gould, The Development of
the Transport Pattern in Ghana (Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 1960), p. 71.

27

For a description of the activities of African gold
concessionaires in the late nineteenth century, see Christopher Fyfe, Africanus Horton (New York, Oxford University
Press, 1972), pp. 128-132.

28

This is not meant to imply that the Europeans never tried
to take over the land in the Gold Coast. In 1897 an
attempt by the government to obtain possession of the land
by passing a Crown Lands Bill had failed, owing both to
opposition from the African community and to a decision
by Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies,
that tribal ownership customs would be flouted were the
land to be declared the property of the Crown. Evidently
Chamberlain realized that it was not necessary to take
over the land in order to encourage production of palm
oil and cocoa, both of which were already flourishing
under African peasant agriculture. For details of the
Drown Lands Bill, see David Kimble, A Political History
of Ghana 1850-1928, (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press,l963),
Ch.IX "The A.R.P.S. and the Lands, 1889-1900".

29

These words were used by a former European cocoa buyer
when describing his company's premises in an interview.

30

From papers in the United Africa Company Archives, document 1/5580, "Notes on the United Africa Company Limited".
It is possible that some of these prorerti.es were overvalued as the purpose of the valuation was to indicate the
worth of the African and Eastern Trade Corporation upon
its amalgamation with the Niger Company in 1929 •

31

Report of the Commission on the Marketing of West African
Cocoa, op. cit., _ pp. 42-43.

32

Figures for 1886, 1890, 1895 are based on Gold Coast
For 1900 and subsequent years, figures are
based on Kay, op. cit., Table 24a, "Government Revenue by
Blue Books.

__........
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Source, 1900-1960", pp. 348-9.
33

That the government was aware that it was the African
peasant producers who ultimately paid the cocoa export
tax is indicated in a statement made by the Gold Coast
Treasurer that "... the direct effect of this tax would be
felt by the cocoa planter in as much as he would receive so
much less per head load ·u/3) that he would otherwise
receive". Gold Coast, Legislative Council Debates, 26
September 1916.

34

"We have done away once and for all with the old policy
of the Government taking up land and sub-letting it afterwards and holding on to the rent themselves. The natives
are going to have the benefit of the land rented to
merchants .•• " Governor Guggisberg, Gold Coast Legislative
Council Debates. 17 November 1919, p. 213.
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